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Abstract
Despite constituting a significant area of everyday experience, emotions have
rarely been the focus of detailed investigation within cultural studies. This paper
makes a case for viewing emotions as social/cultural/political, as well as
individual, phenomena and reviews the contributions of cultural theorists to
analyses of emotions. To this end, it critically examines Raymond Williams’
concept ‘structure of feeling’, which reintroduces the subjective into the social, and
Larry Grossberg’s concept ‘economy of affect’, which seeks to explain how,
through affective investments, ideologies are internalized and naturalized. Whilst
both theorists provide important conceptual tools, each conceptualization has
specific limitations and neither theorist offers detailed analyses of the
interrelations, in practice, between individual and social aspects of emotion. The
authors seek to build on and extend the insights of Williams and Grossberg and
locate emotions in and across specific historical, cultural and political contexts
within relations of hegemony and resistance. The authors begin to theorize how
emotions are constituted and operate interactively at the level of both individual
personal experience and wider social formations/power relations. This paper
establishes the groundwork for working towards a genealogy of specific structures
of feeling and specific emotional subjects. It is argued that theorizing relations
between emotion and power is crucial to this project. The paper discusses ways of
theorizing ‘emotion and power’, and outlines the authors’ approach, which, it is
suggested, could be further explored in relation to concrete examples.
Introduction
Emotions have tended to be ignored or denigrated within Western
philosophical and scientific traditions. This academic stance has been matched by a
frequent, widespread cultural contempt for emotions in which they have been
viewed as infantile and uncivilized things that must be controlled in order for
society to operate smoothly and rationally (Planalp 1999). Academic investigation
of the emotions has taken place principally within a biomedical framework and the
‘psy disciplines’, psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis (Lupton 1998), in
which they have been seen as individual, internal, inherent and private states.
These disciplines have also provided a framework through which emotional
responses have been surveyed, assessed and subjected to a range of practices
directed at management and control.
More recently, however, there has been a growth of interest in the emotions
from within the humanities and social sciences and a focus on emotions as
sociocultural products. An example is Peter Stearns’ (1994) history of the term
cool, which tracks the emergence of an increasingly cooler approach to emotional
expression over the course of the twentieth century. His study includes an analysis

of the 1960s ‘culture of cool’, as well as a look at the 1990s use of the term to
indicate emotional disengagement, almost always with approval and accompanying
positive connotations. Contemporary approbation for emotional disengagement is
apparent in the use of the term cool to describe lack of emotional response. For
example, when parents, teachers, lovers and friends do not express disappointment
or anger or frustration at challenging or provocative things we do, or fail to do,
they are thought to be ‘cool’.
A focus on emotions as sociocultural phenomena seems to have developed
in parallel with a growing twentieth century fascination with, and discovery of,
‘the emotional self’*/involving an intensification of discourses and expert
knowledges centred around emotional expression and intimacy (Lupton 1998, p.
6). Yet, within cultural studies, there has been little detailed investigation of
emotions as part of everyday personal, cultural and political life. Nor has there
been serious consideration of the ways in which emotions may be part of
knowledge production, largely due to the widely held assumption that valid
knowledge results from the exercise of reason that must be opposed to and
properly insulated from emotion. This, we argue, represents a major deficit in
academic inquiry. Significantly, a cultural studies analysis of emotions is capable
of revealing a great deal about how emotions might operate in the reproduction of
subjectivity, culture and power relations. Such analysis would show how emotions
can and must be thought of as collective, as well as individual, phenomena. A
cultural studies approach can also be used to untangle the complex and intricate
ways in which emotions may be deeply insinuated in and contribute to the
production of knowledge.
In this paper, we argue for analyses of the place of emotions in the
production of knowledge, culture, individual and collective identities, and power
relations. We discuss the conceptual tools necessary to do this from a cultural
studies perspective. We consider how concepts developed by cultural theorists
might contribute to such an endeavor. To this end, we critically appraise Raymond
Williams’ concept ‘structure of feeling’ and Larry Grossberg’s notion of ‘economy
of affect’. We outline a direction for further inquiry, which builds on and develops
key aspects of both Williams and Grossberg’s work. We suggest that future
inquiries focus on concrete examples, and investigate how specific emotions are
formed and function as part of the historical, cultural, and political contexts in
which they are practiced to reproduce, and potentially to resist, hegemonic
relations.
The case for studying emotion
Since the Enlightenment, western societies and western knowledge
production have been characterized by an emphasis on and privileging of reason

and rationality, necessarily defined in relation to (the subordinated category of) the
irrational. The rational has been associated with the intellectual, the cultural, the
universal, the public, and the male. The irrational has been associated with the
physical, the natural, the particular, the private, and the female (Jaggar 1989).
Since emotions have been conflated with the irrational, they have been perceived
as antipathetical to conventional knowledge production and have been used to
support the hegemonic position of rationality and its associated categories. In
contrast, we argue that emotions have played a significant role in social, political,
and epistemological configurations of modernity. Indeed, knowledge production
cannot be detached from emotion production, and emotional experience can be
seen as a creative and insightful route to knowledge.
Emotions are widely perceived to be largely individual rather than social
phenomena while ‘the social’ and social institutions are generally understood to be
rationally based. Exceptions to this, like ‘mass hysteria’, are seen as examples of
aberrant behaviour. Social entities at national, governmental, and corporate levels
of operation are presumed not to act emotionally, but, rather, are assumed to
function systematically from principles of rationality. However, emotions are seen
to operate at the level of the social with regard to (and constituting) certain specific
social groupings, for instance women, people of color, and working class people.
Discourses on the emotions function ideologically to define and subordinate
specific social groups, constituting who they are, by associating them with
emotions. Political minorities are often perceived as entire categories that act/react
from emotion, with far reaching consequences. For instance, people of colour and
women have been viewed as more subjective, biased, and irrational while at the
same time, in an ideology confirming and self-defining practice, they may be
culturally required to express emotions more openly. In the case of women, this is
part of conforming to accepted notions of ‘femininity’. The civil and women’s
rights movements of the past decades have had to argue continually that questions
of status and disparity are political problems, and not, as they are often labelled,
personal ones. Historically, the positioning of certain groups as emotional rather
than rational beings has resulted in their exclusion from the sphere of ‘fit’
(rationally motivated) social formations and from attendant political rights and
responsibilities. The assignment of reason and emotion, which bolsters the
authority of dominant groups and discredits subordinate groups, constitutes a
practice of emotional hegemony (Jaggar 1989). Jaggar argues that the emotions
work to position individuals within structures of dominance and relations of power.
At the same time, when emotions that contradict dominant positionings are felt by
a sufficient number of people, they may form a basis for the formation, in
discourse and history, of subcultural experiences and subcultural groups. However,
the possible social/political significances of the emotions and their role in

constituting various subcultural communities have not been subjected to detailed
analysis. It is this work, we argue, which is crying out to be done and to which we
seek to contribute.
As stated earlier, emotions and emotional responses have largely been
investigated through a range of physiological, biomedical and psychological
discourses. These discourses have tended to assume an essentialist perspective in
which emotions are seen as pre-existing biological phenomena - genetically
inscribed and equivalent to physical responses - which are universal to all human
beings and inherent in the individual (Lupton 1998).
However, in the last two decades interest in the academic study of emotions
has gradually arisen in social psychology, cultural anthropology, cultural history,
and sociology. Researchers working within these disciplines have tended to view
emotions as socially constructed, meaning that they are ‘always experienced,
understood and named via social and cultural processes’ (Lupton 1998, p. 15). That
is, emotions are seen as learned, contextual, and intersubjective - rather than
individual - phenomena (Lupton 1998, pp. 15_/ 16). Thus, a social constructionist
perspective entails seeing emotions as historically, socially and politically
contingent, changing and producing social and political effects (Lupton 1998). At
the same time, constructionism brings together a range of theorists who
conceptualize and explore power, subjecthood and social context in quite different
ways and to differing degrees, presenting both insights and limitations. Here, we
examine the possibilities and constraints of two specific examples of
constructionist work which, in different ways, attempt to view emotion as part of
broader cultural and historical processes and knowledge production. We begin with
a critical appraisal of Raymond Williams’ concept ‘structure of feeling’.
Structure of feeling
Raymond Williams’ concept ‘structure of feeling’ is an attempt to formulate
the place of emotions in culture. Specifically developed and applied to the analysis
of literature, Williams understood structure of feeling as an articulation most
readily accessible in the literature of a period, both ‘high art’ and popular fiction,
but which indicates a more general cultural ‘possession’ or presence (1979, p.
159). He described structure of feeling as ‘the felt sense of the quality of life at a
particular place and time’ (1975, p. 47). The emphasis on ‘felt’ is important;
Williams was describing something ‘of feeling much more than thought - a pattern
of impulses, restraints, tones’ (1979, p. 159). In place of the ‘official consciousness
of an epoch - codified in its doctrines and legislation’, Williams was attempting to
bring into historical and theoretical discourse the experiential results of living
within a specific social and cultural context (1979, p. 159). He draws a distinction
between the knowledge which can be derived from an era’s institutions and social

structures versus an understanding of its emotional relations (1975, p. 67).
Williams uses structure of feeling as a class-linked concept, analyzing what he
believes are the principle structures of feeling for each class in a particular era. He
also utilizes it as a periodizing concept, arguing that every generation develops its
own, specific structure of feeling. For instance, in analyzing the 1840s as conveyed
through its literature, Williams describes one of the dominant, that is, middle class,
structures of feeling as ‘an anxious oscillation between sympathy for the oppressed
and fear of their violence’ (1979, p. 166). Speaking of his own historical moment,
he suggests:
The experience of isolation, of alienation, and of self-exile is an
important part of the contemporary structure of feeling, and any
contemporary realist novel would have to come to real terms with it.
(1975, p. 281)
In terms of historical recovery, Williams also argues that the structure of
feeling of any given time or place is extremely difficult to recapture. This is so
because the historical past, ‘the period culture, consciously studied, is necessarily
different from the culture as lived’ (1975, p. 59). Precisely what is missing from
historical investigation, what is omitted from documentation and records and what
is unamenable to institutional analysis is an epoch’s lived sense, its structure(s) of
feeling. And while this difference which Williams labels structure of feeling is
intangible, it is not insignificant.
In The Long Revolution , originally published in 1961, Williams goes to
significant lengths to distinguish ‘structure of feeling’ from ‘social character’, a
distinction he upholds a number of years later, in 1979, when commenting on the
earlier work (1979, p. 163, p. 174). In Williams’ analysis, social character is ‘the
abstract of a dominant group’ (1975, p. 61), representing ‘the official or received
thought of a time’ (1979, p. 163). Social character refers to the prescribed ideas
and values of a social group at a specific historical moment. To continue with the
example of 1840s England, the dominant social character Williams outlines is
based on the morality of the industrial and commercial middle class, although
given significant competition by the social characters of the contemporaneous
aristocratic and working classes. Among the attributes of the middle class social
character are: a belief in work based on individual effort and culminating in
financial success; thrift, sobriety, and piety as principal virtues; and the family as
the central institution (1975, pp. 60_/1). Poverty is viewed as the result of
individual failure caused by insufficient personal effort.
In contrast, structure of feeling deals ‘not only with the public ideals but
with their omissions and consequences, as lived’ (1975, p. 63), that is, something

that exists beyond or in addition to the articulated beliefs and values of a specific
society or social group. In the popular fiction of the 1840s, Williams argues:
The confident assertions of the social character, that success followed
effort, and that wealth was the mark of respect, had to contend, if only
unconsciously, with a practical world in which things were not so simple ...
.What comes through with great force is a pervasive atmosphere of
instability and debt.
(1975, p. 65)
What is significant, Williams points out, is that debt and ruin recurringly occur to
characters but not as a result of their own failings, personal weakness, or lack of
effort. This operates in contradiction to the era’s dominant social character, a belief
in the value and reward of hard work, and introduces a strong element of instability
and anxiety into the social landscape. It is this anxiety which Williams identifies as
an important aspect of the 1840s’ structure of feeling. Thus, Williams likens social
character to an ‘ethic’ and structure of feeling to ‘experience’ (1975, pp. 65_/7).
Within these terms, social character seems most comparable to concepts of
‘ideology’, while structure of feeling attempts to identify other omitted or
overlooked categories of existence.
Williams’ conceptualization of ‘structure of feeling’ represents an attempt to
integrate a notion of experience into social and cultural analysis. He believes
experience has been viewed, traditionally, as a culturally diminished form of
knowledge and communication. Although ‘experience’ is a difficult and often
troubling category of epistemology as Williams himself indicates, it is,
nonetheless, an important one (1979, p. 172).
Historically, one of the limitations with the concept of experience has been
precisely its intimate connection with emotion. Often, what is meant by experience
is a largely affective way of being in and understanding the world. On the one
hand, this is what endows experience with its authenticity because feelings are
‘real’ and immediate. On the other hand, its intimate link with emotion is also what
makes experience epistemologically suspect as either a category of existence or as
a means of analysis in conventional knowledge production.
Williams’ response to the problem of epistemological suspicion is to turn to
the notion of experience as ‘wholeness’. While continuing to foreground its
significant emotional component, experience as full consciousness is not limited to
affect but encompasses the cognitive as well. The integration of cognitive and
affective processes works to bring experience into the terrain of the
epistemological instead of relegating it to the sidelines of analytical utility. For
instance, Williams argues that ‘a certain kind of disturbance or unease, a particular

type of tension’ may mark a moment or site of change, perhaps conflict, between
an instance of structure of feeling and an aspect of social character (quoted in
Probyn 1993, p. 22). In examining this ‘disturbance, tension, blockage, emotional
trouble’, it may be possible to locate a cause or source of the conflict, that is, to
pinpoint an occurrence of cultural change (Probyn 1993, p. 22).
None of this is to suggest that in Williams’ schema experience, particularly
emotion experience, is a more ‘authentic’ or more truthful form of knowledge, as it
has sometimes been positioned historically, for instance, in Romantic
configurations. As Elspeth Probyn points out, experience may work just as well to
obscure as to reveal social relations through, for example, ‘common sense’ feelings
(1993, p. 21). After all, we all live within hegemonic structures and relations and,
as such, experience ‘can also serve to mask the construction of its own ground’
(1993, p. 21).
However, Williams’ analysis includes the recognition that some degree of
credibility often accompanies the accounts of those who have experienced - that is,
personally lived through - an event or state of being. This is the case with cultural
comprehension of what it means to ‘be’ a particular identity formation (a racial or
ethnic minority, a woman, gay or lesbian). Rational analysis cannot exhaust or ‘get
at’ all the meanings and implications of subject identities. The credibility of
experience is based on the assumption that those who immediately experience
something - live it, recognize it emotionally - are better qualified to speak of it or
otherwise represent it.
Experiential credibility would seem to indicate a widespread social belief
that structures of feeling are not equally accessible to all. Social distinctions
(gender, race, age, etc.) are experienced or felt differently depending on one’s
relation(s) to the social formation. This is a central point in Williams’
understanding of experience: it is the linking or mediating of the social formation
and individual existences.
Lived experience is the result of the interaction of the individual and the
social, and never solely that which occurs in a hypothesized separate, personal
realm. Following Williams, experience is the articulation of gender, class, and
boundless other factors at a particular historical moment and geographical site for a
specific constructed subjectivity. It is these interactions, simultaneously personal
and social, that Williams seeks to identify and explore. Structure of feeling is the
concept he develops to describe those interactive relations between individuals and
social formations.
So that in 1840s England, anxiety about economic instability is a culturally
pervasive emotion, felt or experienced by individuals but in response to
contradictions and constraints in the larger social formation. Structure of feeling,

then, is one important means by which the social formation is acted on, and
performed by, individuals.
Similarly, feelings of isolation and alienation are facets of existence that
must be dealt with by individual modernist writers precisely because they represent
significant aspects of modernist social conditions. Structures of feeling are
organizing processes that constrain and suggest how an individual’s emotions - her
or his felt existence - are played out at any given time and place. However, in our
understanding of the concept, structures of feeling are not uni-directional or top
down. As individuals live their era’s structures of feeling, they produce and
reproduce prevalent social conditions.
Bernard Sharratt points out that one of the difficulties with Williams’ notion
of structure of feeling is that it serves ‘simultaneously as both a mediating term and
a formulation of the totality’ (1989, p. 134). Structure of feeling is a formulation of
the totality when used synonymously with ‘culture’, where it is meant to refer to
the entire lived or felt experience of being part of a period’s culture or a class
culture. Structure of feeling is a mediating term when it is applied more
specifically to the relations between individuals and larger, material and nonmaterial social configurations. In drawing on Williams work to develop our
analytical framework, we choose to emphasize the latter mediating sense of
structure of feeling to indicate a productive process that constructs subject
identities and constitutes an always-changing social order.
In our view, ‘emotion’ as a generic category, or particular emotions, in and
of themselves are not structures of feeling. That would be to relate structure of
feeling to culture as a totality. Emotion as an entirety is perhaps best understood as
a vast discursive category akin to ‘reason’ or ‘the body’.
Structures of feeling as mediating concepts are specific deployments of emotion at
specific historical junctures with particularized effects. They refer to the ways an
emotion or emotions manifest at a distinct place and point in time, for instance,
how we contemporarily understand anger to be gendered, or the specific forms
love may have taken in the nineteenth century. To think within the terms of
structures of feeling is to ask what new or changing formations of emotion has it
become possible to think or feel at a given moment? How are such structures of
feeling utilized, what are their meanings and effects?
Used in these ways, the concept structure of feeling opens up significant
theoretical possibilities. The reintroduction of the experiential to include categories
of existence beyond the rational and empirical, without rendering them irrational,
is valuable. The concept allows for certain aspects of experiential existence, such
as the emotions, to have specific, ascertainable, and important effects,
considerations largely excluded from current theoretical formulations. In the notion
of structure of feeling, the emotions are culturally constituted and culturally shared.

While feelings remain largely intangible, their structures of organization and
behaviour become available to analysis. With structure of feeling, the emotions
become a widely held cultural experience, not solely an individual (biological or
behaviourist) one.
Because emotions have been perceived as occurring predominantly at the
level of individual experience, they have been dismissed as a disturbance:
irrational and, consequently, unreliable and insignificant. However, this obscures
the point that they also operate socio-culturally; they act simultaneously as
structures of meaning and structures of power. After all, discourses of the body
also function largely experientially and at the level of the individual. However, as
much recent theory has shown, discourses of the body are intimately connected to
larger social operations. Indeed, they are the means by which social and cultural
discursive formations are embodied. We are arguing a similar set of conditions for
the emotions - they are the means by which social and cultural formations affect
us, that is, render us as feeling beings in a series of complex, specific ways. Simply
because emotions principally are enacted (‘experienced’) at the level of the
individual does not exclude them from being simultaneously implicated in larger
cultural processes and structures nor, for that matter, does it make them immune to
theorization.
While he theorizes experience, including the emotions, as culturally
constituted and shared, Williams tends to conceive of vast, singular structures of
feeling representing relatively unified positions belonging to large class
configurations or single generations at any historical moment or location. This
constitutes an important limitation in his concept. Further, his is an outline with a
minimal sense of conflict, competition, or struggle between the structures of
feeling of any epoch. Indeed, there seems to be a progression or evolution of
structure of feeling from one era to the next. For instance, the structure of feeling
of one generation may solidify into the social character of the next (1979, p. 163).
Williams himself acknowledged the possibility of a multiplicity of co-existing,
alternative structures of feeling, although his own analysis did not account for this
(1979, p. 158). We suggest that Williams’ phrase, structure of feeling, could be
pluralized in order to emphasize the wealth of structures of feeling operational at
any historical moment. The concept, structures of feeling, could be used to
describe the attempt to identify manifold, particularized structures within the more
general structuration, organization or economy of emotion.
Additionally, Williams does not specifically link structure of feeling to
concepts of hegemony or power relations. Instead, he has a tendency to see
structure of feeling as something like the ‘truth’ of an era, overlooked and largely
undocumented, as a result of being masked by the social character of the day.

Despite these limitations, Williams’ conceptualization represents emotions as rich,
complex sociocultural practices, with productive functions. Which is to say,
emotions produce culture and are not simply the reverberations of other social
formations and force relations. Williams’ work broadens the concept of the
sociocultural to include kinds of experience beyond the rational and empirical; it
attempts to account for those felt aspects of lived existence that elude records,
documents, and most historical and public accounts. His work outlines the
possibilities for recapturing intellectually what has been experienced affectively. In
order to build on Williams’ insights and, specifically, to take account of power
relations and the ways in which they might be linked with structures of feeling, we
now consider key aspects of Grossberg’s writings.
Affective economies
Larry Grossberg is one of the few contemporary cultural theorists who have
argued consistently for the necessity of work on an economy of affect. His writings
on the subject matter attempt to link the individual to larger cultural processes and,
significantly, to explore how power operates through affect.
According to Grossberg, the social formation is composed of many,
continually changing planes of effects or economies of which the affective is one
among several - ‘capital, money, meanings, information, representations, identities,
desires’, and so on (1997, p. 241). He argues that the British tradition of cultural
studies has reduced what is considered to be the pertinent range of economies to
‘meaning, representation, and identity’. Indeed, ‘it is the articulation of these three
economies that [Stuart] Hall describes as ideology’ (1997, p. 397). The result, in
Grossberg’s view, is a tendency in cultural studies to reduce all culture to the
domain of meaning and representation (1997, p. 251). Grossberg defines meaning
specifically as cognitive, semantic, or narrative systems or contents (1992, p. 43).
Although meaning and representation are important and constantly active factors,
they do not exhaust all economies in the social formation. Indeed, a focus on
signification, representation and identity to the exclusion of other economies has
resulted in a reduction of the social to the cultural (1997, p. 283).
One consequence of equating meaning and representation with culture in its
entirety is that neglected economies such as the affective are reduced to subfunctions of ideology rather than considered in terms of their own distinct
operations, organizations and effects: ‘Emotion is itself a notoriously difficult topic
for cultural critics who often try to explain it as if it were merely the aura of
ideological effects’ (1992, p. 79). Further, in the traditional cultural studies model,
power is subsumed in meaning while Grossberg, influenced by Foucault’s work,
believes meaning must be located as a function or effect of power.

If the affective has been subsumed within the ideological on the one hand,
Grossberg continues, it has similarly been swallowed up as a sub-category of the
libidinal, for instance in the work of Screen theorists (1988, p. 282), and, more
generally, in psychoanalytic theory. He suggests distinguishing between ‘libidinal
economies of desire and affective economies of mood’ as different planes of
effectivity (1988, p. 285). Grossberg’s proposal is to add affect into ‘the already
crowded relations’ of signification (meaning, representation, language), economy
(material production, distribution, and consumption), and libido (desire, sexuality)
(1988, p. 282). Everyday life is the articulation of all of these planes of effects
operating together, along with potential others.
Defining affect as one form of ‘psychic energy’, he attributes to it the
authority of ‘investment’. ‘It is the coloration or passion within which one’s
investments in, or commitments to, the world are made possible’ (1988, p. 285).
Affect, here, is a form of energy, a motivating force or intensity rather than a
system of interpretation. Affect consists of quantitatively variable levels of energy
that identify ‘the strength of the investment’ people have in their experiences,
practices, identities, meanings, and so on (1992, p. 82). It determines degrees of
passion, or lack of, telling people ‘where, how and with what intensities they can
become absorbed - into their work and their lives’ (1992, p. 82). Affect determines
or constitutes what matters to individuals. But Grossberg makes the important
point that affect is not, contrary to much popular belief, ‘anarchic excess
threatening to disrupt the structures of power’ (1997, p. 28). Rather, it is a
structured plane of effects that forms part of the force relations working to govern
people’s conduct. Affect is one of the means by which power is constituted,
mobilized, circulated and performed.
Here, as does Williams with structure of feeling, Grossberg links the
individual with the social formation through the activities and energies of affect.
But he adds the critical component of power. Indeed, affect becomes an important
form of energy or intensity that motivates relations of power among individuals as
well as between individuals and the social forces governing their conduct.
Turning to the example of rock and roll, he argues that only a portion of rock
and roll’s effects can be understood within the context of signifying practices. In
order to understand its impact and importance one must also come to an
understanding of its affective effects and politics, because rock and roll transforms
‘the affective geography of the everyday lives of its fans’ (1984, p. 101).
Grossberg’s point is that affect needs to be taken into account as a constitutive
aspect of popular culture. It is insufficient to heed popular culture only when it is
transformed, through interpretation, into either ‘art’ or, as in some avenues of
cultural studies, ideology/hegemony, that is to say, when it takes on meaning.

A potential problem with a position that argues the prevalence of an
affective dimension in popular culture is that its application may lead to too
dramatic a bifurcation of popular culture from elite culture, or of feeling from
thinking. This may suggest an antithetical relationship between high art and pop
culture, as well as between meaning and affect, as if high culture audiences do not
feel and popular culture audiences do not think. But, significantly, Grossberg
observes that popular culture’s dominantly affective dimension is not inherent but
historically constituted and that ‘a large part of the struggle over popular culture
concerns the ability of certain practices to have such effects’ (1992, p. 79). That is,
popular culture practices have fought to represent and retain their association with
affective experience.1
The ‘interpretive task’ facing cultural studies and left-wing politics alike is
to identify the strategies and sites where affective empowerment might be possible,
beginning with popular culture forms that resonate affectively for consumers
(1988, p. 290): ‘Those differences which do matter [affectively] can become the
site of ideological struggle’ (1992, p. 105). Things that matter affectively can be
taken up as sites of ideological assertion or contestation. Political positions can be
claimed through and shaped by modes or instances of felt popular culture.
Arguably, this is what many contemporary cultural theorists have attempted
to do in the move towards the analysis of popular culture. Specific subjects from
pop culture are chosen for study, not because they are a priori ‘artistically’
significant to a trained critical eye or carry some other elite cultural value but,
precisely the opposite, because they have mass emotional appeal. To continue with
the example of popular music, in the case of ‘Madonna studies’ critical effort has
been directed towards recapturing, for historical record, the basis of her wide
appeal. Theoretical activity is taken up after popular fact, in an attempt to account
for the widespread emotional affiliation of fans and to pinpoint that which is so
resistant, in Williams’ terms, to historical investigation and documentation. What
are the sources and effects of extensive popularity? Can they be turned into
political statements or acts? Can such affective investments and energies be used to
identify emergent subcultural identities? For instance, scholars have analyzed
Madonna, particularly in her early years as a public phenomenon, in order to
understand something about the existences, the growing economic impact, and the
cultural influence of teenage girls (Kaplan 1988, Schwichtenberg 1993).
Grossberg’s work is significant for putting affect on the ‘mattering map’ of
theory. His outline also raises a number of critical issues for a cultural analysis of
the emotions. To begin with, affect as investment is no doubt an aspect of great
import, but it is not necessarily exhaustive. For instance, a potential aspect in the
overall spectrum of affect is its role as an organizing or structuring circuit of social
activity, regardless of degree or kind of investment. Affect may be seen as

producing dependencies, responsibilities, connections, ruptures, obligations,
accountabilities, and so on. It may form a basis for the social processes of
recognition and difference. Following Jaggar’s arguments, for instance, emotions
are pivotal in identity formations, in the recognition of alienation from or
connection to. She discusses how unexplained or uncoded feelings may cause one
to feel isolated or ‘abnormal’, while recognition of others with similar feelings can
serve as the ground for the formation of subcultural groups (1989). Affect is also
integral to the notion of individuality, to the sense of what makes each of us
‘distinct’. As such, it plays a formative role in subjectivity. Nor do there seem
sufficient grounds for dispensing with affect as a means of communication,
between individuals as well as between group formations. Affect is an important
means by which power is enacted between individuals and social conditions. But it
is also a pivotal mechanism in the circulation of power among individuals. This
communicative aspect of affect - the porous quality that enables emotions to be
exchanged easily with other people - assists in making us susceptible to the
emotion effects and power influences of others, individuals as well as social forces
and ideologies. Affect is also, in turn, a means by which we are able to exert the
effects of power relations on others. As forms of communication, emotions
produce relations, movement and activity between individuals.
All of the above are contexts in which what matters is not how much or how
little or even which emotion is present. Of significance is how any amount (or
absence) of affect is used, what functions it serves. All of the above circumstances,
and more, would result in the execution of affect as a technology of power without
limiting it, solely, to forces of investment and energy.
Grossberg identifies affect as quantity or intensity of feeling by
differentiating affect from emotion. Emotions are ‘the product of the articulation of
two planes: signification ... and affect’ (1992, p. 79). Emotion equals affect
articulated to another plane of effect - representation, ideology, meaning: ‘[A]ffect
can be articulated through the mediating effects of ideological narratives to
produce different forms of emotional response and involvement’ (1992, p. 81).
Emotion exists when affect is mediated with ideology, and specific emotions exist
when specific combinations of affect and ideology merge or clash. The advantage
of the disjuncture between affect and emotion, in his analysis, is that it allows
affect to function as passion, solely in terms of degree of feeling, by bracketing out
other uses and functions of emotion.
Because his primary concern is with affect, Grossberg says relatively little
about emotion or its specific distinctions from affect, leaving this important
differentiation insufficiently outlined. How does one distinguish affect from
emotion? What are the significances of their demarcation - why do we need or
benefit from distinguishing them as concepts? For instance, describing both The

Sound of Music (Robert Wise 1965) and Wild at Heart (David Lynch 1990) as
extraordinarily manipulative, Grossberg asserts that The Sound of Music ‘works on
and through emotional narrative’ whereas Wild at Heart ‘works more immediately
on affective investments’ (1992, p. 81). This is an intriguing observation that could
usefully be developed further. In another example, he cites Jack Nicholson as an
icon of the 1970s who is ‘always invested in a mission, always in search of a
cause’ (1992, p. 224), and as such who functions as meaning, representing
something. His counterpart is Dennis Hopper, icon of the 1980s, who functions as
‘pure intensity or affect’ (1992, p. 224). If Hopper functions as affect, then
Nicholson functions as emotion. Without a more detailed analysis of the
distinctions between affect and emotion, affect seems to exist in a kind of limbo,
operating ‘in something like the ‘‘preconscious’’’ (1992, p. 81). It then becomes
difficult to see how this preconscious system is historically and culturally
constituted rather thanintrinsic.
However, configuring affect as asignifying or contentless bears the
advantage, from Grossberg’s perspective, of dislodging affect from the circuit of
meaning relations, and placing it directly into the more fundamental circuit of
power relations. Grossberg positions affect as occurring prior to or outside of
meaning. As cited earlier, the differences that do matter can then become a site for
ideological struggle. It is conceivable, though, that this relation might as often
occur in the inverse so that those differences that do matter ideologically (are
meaningful) become the site of affective investment and struggle. The relations
between affect and ideology can be made clearer only with a fuller account of
when, how, and in what forms affect and emotion operate separately.
In advocating the need for critical theory to account for the importance of
affect in all areas of existence and epistemology, Grossberg’s work provides an
important cultural studies framework for, as well as an isolated voice on, the
contemporary problem of affect and culture. He argues persuasively that we cannot
make adequate sense of popular culture - and by extension, we believe, of any
cultural forms or activities - solely by considering them as cognitive, rational or
ideological practices. Affect is, indeed, the ‘missing term’ which might explain, for
instance, why certain ideologies take hold and not others, or how, through affective
investments, ideologies are internalized and naturalized (1992, pp. 82_/3).
Grossberg’s call for an account of the role of affect and the development of a
critical vocabulary to describe its forms and structures, marks an important
moment of departure in the cultural study of emotion (1992, p. 80). His is an
attempt, akin to Williams’, to bring to historical recognition and into theoretical
discourse largely omitted aspects of ‘the felt sense’ of existence. Both Grossberg
and Williams work to account for experience beyond ideology or social character,

in order to describe what it means to live the emotional effects of specific social
and cultural contexts.
Here, we take up where Grossberg left off on emotion by considering it in
his sense of the product of affect and ideology. We understand emotions as
signifying practices already imbricated with or articulated through power and
meaning effects. We do not see, at this point and without further study, how affect
can be made accessible to analysis without functioning as a signifying practice.
Grossberg’s notion of emotion, on the other hand, engages most usefully with
Williams’ concept of experience as ‘wholeness’, of the felt sense of existence as an
integration of the cognitive and affective. From our perspective, it is more
productive to consider emotion within the cycle of meaning production. Although
we understand Grossberg’s concern that affect not be considered solely as an
‘aura’ of ideology, we believe that considering emotion as interconnected with
signifying practices enhances the ability to analyse emotion as an important
function in the circulation of power relations.
Additionally, we do not consider affect, in its function as constitutive of
emotion, to be solely an energy or intensity; rather, as discussed above, we
understand it as entailing other effects and operations (communication, processes
of recognition and difference, construction of subjectivity as individuality, and so
on). Expanding the notion of affect to effects beyond intensity also has the
corollary advantage of minimizing the likelihood that affect might be interpreted as
something akin to a ‘drive’ in psychoanalytic terms, which serves primarily to
propel other formations - ideological, economic, libidinal. In the configuration we
suggest, a broader notion of an affective economy (communication, recognition,
and so on) becomes a ‘standalone’ system that produces and reproduces its own
complex network of power and meaning relations, at the same time that it operates
in conjunctive relations with other economies.
Moving on: developing cultural analyses of emotion
In many areas of academic inquiry - notably the natural sciences and other
disciplines that seek to apply the methods of the natural sciences - researchers are
urged not to feel, to put feelings aside as a necessary condition of investigating
thoroughly and effectively and establishing true and reliable knowledge. Indeed,
since the Enlightenment and the hegemony of scientific method, emotions have
been conflated with the irrational and regarded as in opposition to conventional
knowledge production, so bolstering the hegemonic position of rationality. Social
science and feminist critiques of science have shown that a clear opposition and
separation between fact and value, objectivity and subjectivity, is not possible. In
addition, postmodernist feminist philosophy and critiques of the enlightenment
subject, and the binary concepts on which it is founded, direct us towards a

rejection of the binary pairs: fact and value, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and
feeling, reason and emotion. Just as the subject who knows is always also an
embodied subject, so he/she is always a feeling subject.
Further, we argue that emotion does not have to be seen as working against
the production of reliable knowledge. In some fields of inquiry - ethnography and
oral history, for example - the investigator’s ability to feel with the subject enables
conversation and the re-telling of experiences and confidences that constitute the
data and direct its interpretation, analysis, and writing up. In many instances,
clarity of thought occurs as a result of feeling emotion. For instance, often one
knows unmistakably what one wishes to say when writing a business memo out of
anger or frustration, when composing a love letter, or when crafting a eulogy for a
funeral.
We would prefer to think of emotions and knowledge production in the
following way. Emotions are always in play in any inquiry but to differing extents.
That is, research operates through relations of closeness and difference (between
investigator and investigated whether human or non-human) where these are
context specific - depending on the area of inquiry, the subjects involved, and their
experiences, the aims and purposes of the inquiry. These contexts are, of course,
also always historically and politically located and part of a dynamic play of power
relations. This brings us to consideration of relations between power and emotion,
subjectivity and culture.
As argued earlier, Williams and Grossberg provide groundwork for
conceptualizing how emotions may be part of the constitution of culture and
collective identities. However, neither theorist offers a detailed analysis of the
inter-relations, in practice, between individual identities and social formations. It is
precisely this area of interaction that concerns us and which, we argue, is crying
out for detailed analysis. Here, we consider how such analyses might be developed.
We argue that such analysis should involve a thorough exploration of the relations
between power and emotion and focus on specific concrete examples, that is, on
particular structures of feeling. This approach is informed by the cultural studies
notion of ‘radical contextuality’ and is designed to delineate how structures of
feeling are effective at an individual micro level but always as part of macro
sociocultural operations and the constant circulation of power.
Structures of feeling as technologies of power operate at the level of the
relationship between the social body and individual bodies, working to make the
latter disciplined and productive. We need to consider how emotions are
instrumental in the (re)production of power relations. To do this, we would look at
the ways in which emotions might work as techniques of discipline that help shape
what we do and who we are (Harding & Pribram 2002). Here, we would be
thinking about how emotions might be a means of deploying power relations.

However, as we have pointed out in a previous paper, a view of emotion-as-power
does not fully account for the complexity and changeability of emotions and may
tend to be overly deterministic. Instead, we need a more subtle and detailed
conceptualization of relations between power and emotion, culture and
subjectivity, social formations and individual identities.
We are arguing that, among other forces, emotion makes possible the
exertion and reception of the effects of power relations, thereby constructing the
subject and, more specifically, the emotional subject. In other words, the subject
who feels is critical to the circulation of power, the establishment of social
relations, and the construction of discursive and institutional formations.
Emotions are forces of energy creating ongoing movement that propels
social relations. The circulation of emotion produces in and between people
connections, ruptures, dependencies, responsibilities, accountabilities, and so on.
In other words, people care - they are invested. If people care, certain effects are
produced: they feel and act in certain ways. Individuals have emotional relations, a
significant form of social relations. It is through these relations that subjects are
‘affected’, that they are constituted into specifically contoured kinds of feeling
beings. Following Grossberg, the task facing cultural studies is to identify the
strategies and sites where emotional authority might be possible, in addition to
pinpointing the locations and terms within which emotions subordinate.
Williams’ conceptualization of ‘structure of feeling’ directs us towards a
concept of the sociocultural realm which includes aspects of lived experience
beyond the rational and empirical and which is missing from official records and
documents. Feeling is seen as something to be included and elaborated rather than
expunged from public and historical accounts, as part of the production of
knowledge about the past. In this way, specific structures of feeling might form the
content of historical inquiry and historiography - as, for example, in Stearn’s
history of ‘cool’ or our own work on the construction of sensibility in the
eighteenth century and the emergence of the emotional/ psychological subject in
the twentieth century.2
Similarly, we might consider the nineteenth and early twentieth century
cases of hysteria, neurasthenia and shell shock. Analysis within the framework we
are suggesting indicates that they operated as structures of feeling. That is,
hysteria, neurasthenia and shell shock occurred not simply as specific illnesses, but
as entire organizations which coded ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ feelings and
behaviour. They worked to identify, through diagnosis, and constitute, through
symptoms and treatment, subcultures based on the categories of gender, class and
sexuality.
The specific experiencing of a social event is what Williams meant by
structure of feeling: the felt sense of existence at a particular historical time and

location, felt in these instances in terms of emotional disorders. Such an experience
is something that occurs beyond the confines of an era’s social character, not in the
sense of an entire alternate social reality but as something that invades the
dominant social order. Indeed, such emotional disorders can be understood as the
repercussions or reverberations of what it means to live within the framework of
the stated beliefs and values of a dominant social formation.
Following Williams, the different but related emotional disorders of hysteria,
neurasthenia, and shell-shock represent the ‘omissions and circumstances as lived’
of the hegemonic positions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
failure to live up to the public ideals of the era. In their own time, these emotional
illnesses may have served as the warnings, embodied by individuals, of the dangers
involved in failing to adhere to the ideological expectations of the day: the angel of
the household, the strongwilled businessman, the courageous solider. From an
historical perspective, the hysteric, the neurasthenic, the victim of shell-shock bear
the lived weight, the individually experienced failures, of their era’s sociallymandated roles and ideals.
Subjects can experience an era’s structures of feeling in keeping with its
social character or ideological imperatives - in consensus with prevailing
hegemony. Or they can live those structures of feelings in discomfort with or in
contradiction to an historical moment’s prevailing demands, resulting in the
possibility for resistance.
Grossberg’s ideas concerning power and emotion serve as an antidote for
Williams’ tendency to see structure of feeling as a truth-value, as the unintended
reverberations of existing ideologies. In describing structure of feeling as the lived
experience of the unintended consequences of an era, Williams points to something
that appears to be leftover from the dominant articulations of the day. In Williams’
terms, structures of feeling may be interpreted as existing outside the circle of
power relations and dominant discourses.
In contrast, Grossberg’s conceptualizations place emotion squarely inside
the system of meaning production and subject construction. Indeed, the
consequence of this is to reaffirm that there is no outside or beyond the forces of
energy created by and constituting power relations. Further, the introduction of
power as it operates affectively adds the much needed dimension of struggle,
contention, competition, and exchange - in short, movement - to Williams’
relatively vast and inert sense of structure of feeling operating for entire social
classes or eras.
The question of emotion’s ideological/discursive role is, as Grossberg
suggests, the question of how emotion governs people’s conduct. Grossberg’s
notion of emotional investment can be further explored by considering the ways in
which how we care describes who we think we are. In principle, an emotional

investment must be ‘made’ - directed towards something, enacted, revealed or
concealed. An example might be the contemporarily popular subject of the
expression of emotion - who does or should express emotion and the effects of this,
in particular in its gendered connotations, as part of the ongoing construction of the
category gender.
In contemporary Western cultures, a prevailing assumption exists that men
suppress emotion more frequently and more extensively than women - to varyingly
positive or negative effects - while women display and release emotions more
readily. Women tend to be seen as more emotionally ‘skilled’ and ‘fluent’, which
confers a positive meaning. However, in contrast, being ‘more emotional’ is most
often equated with being less in control of feelings in a pejorative or problematic
way and has served as justification for women’s exclusion from any number of
corridors of power.
Further, the gendered expression of emotion is dependent upon the emotion
being considered. Men are regarded as better able to express certain emotions anger, frustration, impatience. It then becomes possible to analyse emotions, such
as anger or non-anger, as gendered structures of feeling.
Such views need not be construed as essentializing. Rather, gendered
subjects can be seen as constructed in/through specific discursive events such as
the expression or ‘repression’ of emotion. In this case, individual subjects must
live and feel the specificities of such constructions, and they must constantly
reenact - relive, refeel - those specificities in order to sustain their identities. This is
a point at which inter-relations between individual identities and social formations
can be explored and demonstrated – that emotions have been used as a technology
in the subordination of women and other social beings.
Emotional relations do not exist between people in some kind of equivalency
or equilibrium. Emotions are utilized in the exerting and reaffirming of power
differentials. But how emotions circulate and subordinate as they are relayed
throughout the social formation is complex, constantly changing, and insufficiently
understood.
To view emotions as simply subordinating is to duplicate concepts of
emotions as negative forces, as burdens we are forced to endure, and against which
we must be constantly vigilant. It is to deny that emotional relations, like power
relations, are productive: they not only subordinate, they create.
We emphasize that we are not conceiving of emotion in a universal or
essential way. Instead, we stress the diversity of culturally and historically specific
phenomena encompassed by the term ‘emotion’. We think in terms of culturally
and historically specific structures of feeling and, particularly, of what emotions
different categories of subjects are culturally permitted to express, and how power
relations, subjectivity and collectivities are brought into being through specific

articulations of emotion. An analytics of emotion must examine specific
occurrences and concrete examples. It must thoroughly examine: how emotions
might be constituted and experienced; how they are used, that is, what their effects
might be; how they might function with/in structures of power, towards both
dominant and resistant ends; and what role they play in the formation of
subjectivity and identity in the everyday lives and practices of individuals.
In other words, in order to further develop an analysis of emotion and
relations between emotion and power, subjectivity and culture, we think that
‘power and emotion’ need to be discussed in detail and in relation to concrete
examples. We are interested in working towards a genealogy of specific structures
of feeling and specific emotional subjects. Emotions are constructed through their
establishment and reestablishment, their production and reproduction. In turn,
emotions construct subjects and, in doing so, make the subject an ongoing
possibility. Emotions are forms of circulating power: forces that produce human
relations, energies and activities.
In conclusion
Following on from Williams and Grossberg, we have attempted to show that
emotions are an important and valid area of inquiry in cultural studies. We have
begun to set out an approach to this work. Our analysis is not intended to suggest
that emotions are somehow imaginary because they are constructed. Quite the
opposite, their distinctions are experienced, which is to say they are ‘real’. The
point in analyzing structures of feelings, whose effects constitute emotive
subjectivity as individual experience, is precisely because those effects are felt and
enacted.
Structures of feeling are complexes of emotional and related behaviours,
operating at particular historical moments and sites, which participate in the
processes of constituting and reproducing individual subjectivities, subcultural
identities and social communities. Structures of feeling as processes of mediation
between the individual and the social occur in the context of socially organized
affective economies imbued with power relations working towards the production
and reproduction of various cultural practices. The task of an analytics, which
seeks to insert emotions into the sphere of cultural theory, must be twofold. First, it
should provide emotions with an epistemological basis, to mark them out as a valid
area of study. Second, it is to grant them validity as experiential formations, as
ways of knowing in the practices of everyday life.

Notes
1. Grossberg also points out that high culture may be popular culture for some
social fractions and, as such, involves affective experience (personal
correspondence).
2. These are discussed in a book we are currently writing entitled Structures of
Feeling: Emotions and Cultural Theory.
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